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This paper is concerned with a maximum principle for both zero-sum and nonzero-sum
games. The most distinguishing feature, compared with the existing literature, is that the
game systems are described by forward–backward stochastic differential equations. This
kind of games is motivated by linear-quadratic differential game problems with generalized
expectation. We give a necessary condition and a suﬃcient condition in the form of
maximum principle for the foregoing games. Finally, an example of a nonzero-sum game is
worked out to illustrate that the theories may ﬁnd interesting applications in practice. In
terms of the maximum principle, the explicit form of an equilibrium point is obtained.
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1. Introduction
This work is interested in the stochastic differential games of systems of forward–backward stochastic differential equa-
tions (FBSDEs, for short). One of the motivations of this study is the problem of ﬁnding a saddle point in a linear quadratic
(LQ, for short) zero-sum differential game, where the performance criterion is deﬁned by generalized expectation. We now
explain this in more detail.
We consider the following controlled linear stochastic differential equation (SDE, for short):{
dX(t) = [A1X(t) + B1v1(t) + C1v2(t)]dt + [A2X(t) + B2v1(t) + C2v2(t)]dB(t),
X(0) = X0,
(1)
with the performance criterion
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)= 1
2
E
{〈
GX(T ), X(T )
〉+
T∫
0
[〈
A3X(t), X(t)
〉+ 〈B3v1(t), v1(t)〉+ 〈C3v2(t), v2(t)〉]dt
}
. (2)
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formulated as follows:
Problem (LQ)20. For any X0 ∈ Rn, ﬁnd a (u1(·),u2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2[0, T ] such that
J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)= sup
v2(·)∈U2[0,T ]
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1[0,T ]
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
= inf
v1(·)∈U1[0,T ]
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2[0,T ]
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
,
where U1 × U2[0, T ] denotes certain admissible control set.
Remark 1.1. The expectation E in (2) is a linear expectation and does not express people’s preferences or criterion involving
risk (see [1,4,5] and the references therein). One alternative way is to use the so-called generalized expectation induced
by backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short) to characterize the performance criterion (see Peng [15,16]),
because generalized expectation satisﬁes all the properties that expectation E has, except for its linearity.
Consider the following BSDE:{
dη(t) = −g(ζ(t))dt + ζ(t)dB(t),
η(T ) = ξ. (3)
Under certain conditions, Eq. (3) has a unique solution (η(·), ζ(·)). In addition to condition g(ζ ) = 0 ⇔ ζ = 0, we deﬁne
Eg(ξ) = η(0). (4)
Eg(ξ) is called the generalized expectation (also called g-expectation) of ξ associated with g (see Peng [15]). With the
above generalized expectation, we introduce the following new performance criterion
J g
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)= 1
2
Eg
(〈
GX(T ), X(T )
〉+
T∫
0
[〈
A3X(t), X(t)
〉+ 〈B3v1(t), v1(t)〉+ 〈C3v2(t), v2(t)〉]dt
)
, (5)
and formulate stochastic LQ differential game problem with generalized expectation as follows:
Problem (LQ)2g . For any X0 ∈ Rn, ﬁnd a u¯(·) ∈ U2[0, T ] such that
J g
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)= sup
v2(·)∈U2[0,T ]
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1[0,T ]
J g
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
= inf
v1(·)∈U1[0,T ]
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2[0,T ]
J g
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
. (6)
In order to connect Problem (LQ)2g with the game problem of forward–backward stochastic systems, we construct a
decoupled FBSDE:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
dX(t) = [A1X(t) + B1v1(t) + C1v2(t)]dt + [A2X(t) + B2v1(t) + C2v2(t)]dB(t),
dY (t) = −[g(Z(t))+ 〈A3X(t), X(t)〉+ 〈B3v1(t), v1(t)〉+ 〈C3v2(t), v2(t)〉]dt + Z(t)dB(t),
X(0) = X0, Y (T ) = 1
2
〈
GX(T ), X(T )
〉
,
(7)
with the new performance criterion
J¯
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)= E
{ T∫
0
[
g
(
Z(t)
)+ 〈A3X(t), X(t)〉+ 〈B3v1(t), v1(t)〉
+ 〈C3v2(t), v2(t)〉]dt + 1
2
〈
GX(T ), X(T )
〉}
. (8)
Then Problem (LQ)2g is equivalent to max-minimizing the performance criterion (8) over (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1×U2[0, T ], subject
to FBSDE (7). Namely, it can be transformed into a differential game problem with the system of FBSDE (7) and performance
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further research.
Since the foundations of game theory were presented by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [21], the importance of strategic
behavior in theory and practice has been increasingly recognized and many authors have joined in the study of differential
games. Game theory pervading economic theory, attracts more and more research attentions, and is used widely in other
social and behavioral sciences. It is also a very good tool which helps us understand economic, social, political, and biolog-
ical phenomena. Game theoretic methods gradually dominate microeconomic theory and are used in many other ﬁelds of
economics and a wide range of other social and behavioral sciences. For more information, refer to J. Osborne [17]. There is
a large amount of literature about game theory, for example, Kieu An and Øksendal [2], Hamadène [6], Jiang [7,8], Jimenez-
Lizarraga and Fridman [9], Jimenez-Lizarraga and Basin [10], Konishi et al. [11], Lim and Zhou [12], Wu [23], Yong [26],
Yeung and Petrosjan [25], etc. However, the game systems they studied are either ODEs or SDEs, not involve more general
FBSDEs.
The theory of FBSDEs has received considerable research attention in recent years because of its interesting structure and
its usefulness in various applied areas such as dynamic risk measure, stochastic optimal control, stochastic differential utility,
option pricing, contingent claim valuation, and second order partial differential equation theories. For more information,
refer to Ma and Yong [13], Yong and Zhou [28], and the references therein. Due to the well-deﬁned dynamics of FBSDEs
and the broad applications of game theory, it is very natural and appealing, at the theoretical level, to consider the game
problems of FBSDEs.
To our best knowledge, there are not many studies on optimal control of FBSDEs. There are only a few papers dealing
with this class of control problems (see, e.g., Peng [14], Shi and Wu [19], Xu [24] and Yong [27] for non-random jumps, and
Øksendal and Sulem [18] and Shi and Wu [20] for random jumps), but there are few papers on game theories of FBSDEs
and performance criteria. Up till now, there are only two papers about differential games of BSDEs: one is Yu and Ji [30],
where an LQ nonzero-sum game was studied by a standard completion of squares techniques and the explicit form of a
Nash equilibrium point was obtained; the other one is Wang and Yu [22], where the game system was a nonlinear BSDE,
and a necessary condition and a suﬃcient condition in the form of maximum principle were established, respectively.
However, the game problems mentioned above are restricted to forward (stochastic) or backward stochastic systems. To
our best knowledge, there are only two papers about the differential games of forward–backward stochastic systems (see
Buckdahn and Li [3] and Yu [29]). In Buckdahn and Li [3], the game system was described by a decoupled FBSDE, and
the performance criterion was deﬁned by the solution variable of BSDE, at the value at time 0. Buckdahn and Li proved
a dynamic programming principle for both the upper and the lower value functions of the game, and showed that these
two functions are the unique viscosity solutions to the upper and the lower Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman–Isaacs equations,
but they neither considered the nonzero-sum games problem nor initiated a study of a necessary condition and a suﬃcient
condition in the form of maximum principle. Recently, Yu [29] studied a linear-quadratic case of nonzero-sum game problem
for forward–backward stochastic systems, where the FBSDE method was employed to obtain an explicit Nash equilibrium
point. However, in the present paper, we shall study the problem in the general situation.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the zero-sum and nonzero-sum games of forward–
backward stochastic systems, respectively. In Section 3, combining FBSDE theory with certain classical convex variational
techniques, we prove a necessary condition and a suﬃcient condition for the foregoing game problems in the form of
maximum principle. In Section 4, an example of a nonzero-sum differential game is worked out to illustrate theoretical ap-
plications. In terms of maximum principle, the explicit form of an equilibrium point is obtained. Finally, this paper provides
some concluding remarks.
2. Formulation of the problem
Let T be a ﬁxed constant and (Ω,F , {Ft}0tT , P ) be a complete ﬁltered probability space, on which a standard
Brownian motion B(·) ∈ Rd is deﬁned with {Ft}0tT being the P -completed natural ﬁltration generated by B(·) and F 
FT . Let |x| denote the Euclidean norm of x ∈ Rn and 〈x, y〉 be the inner product of x, y ∈ Rn . The transpose and Euclidean
norm of a matrix M = (mij)1in,1 jd = (m1, . . . ,md) ∈ Rn×d are expressed as M∗ and |M| =
√
trace(MM∗), respectively.
Similarly, 〈M1,M2〉 = trace(M1M∗2) with M1,M2 ∈ Rn×d . We also introduce the following three spaces of processes which
will be frequently used in the sequel:
LpFT
(
Ω;Rk) {ξ :Ω → Rk ∣∣ ξ isFT -measurable, E|ξ |p < +∞};
S p(0, T ;Rn) {φ(·) ∣∣∣ φ(·) is an Rn-valuedFt-adapted càdlàg process: E[ sup
0tT
∣∣φ(t)∣∣p]< +∞};
Hp(0, T ;Rn×d)
{
φ(·)
∣∣∣ φ(·) is an Rn×d-valuedFt-adapted càdlàg process: E
[ T∫ ∣∣φ(t)∣∣p dt
]
< +∞
}
.0
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p
FT
(Ω;Rk), S p = S p(0, T ;Rn), Hp =
Hp(0, T ;Rn×d) and do not mention the concrete dimensions. For x ∈ Rn , y ∈ Rm×d and an Rk-valued vector function f
on Rn × Rm×d , we use the notations
fx
.=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∂ f 1
∂xi
∂ f 1
∂x2
· · · ∂ f 1
∂xn
∂ f 2
∂xi
∂ f 2
∂x2
· · · ∂ f 2
∂xn
...
...
. . .
...
∂ f k
∂xi
∂ f k
∂x2
· · · ∂ f k
∂xn
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , f
i
y
.=
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
∂ f i
∂ y11
∂ f i
∂ y21
· · · ∂ f i
∂ ym1
∂ f i
∂ y12
∂ f i
∂ y22
· · · ∂ f i
∂ ym2
...
...
. . .
...
∂ f i
∂ y1d
∂ f i
∂ y2d
· · · ∂ f i
∂ ymd
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
Let Ui be a nonempty convex subset of Rki (i = 1,2). We deﬁne the admissible control set Ui by
Ui =
{
vi(·)
∣∣∣ vi(·) : [0, T ] × Ω → Ui is an Ft-adapted process
and satisﬁes that E
T∫
0
vi(t)
2 dt < ∞
}
(i = 1,2). (9)
For each i, Ui is called an open-loop admissible control for Player i on [0, T ] (i = 1,2). U1 ×U2 is called the set of open-loop
admissible controls for the players. For notational simplicity, hereinafter, we omit ω in u.
We introduce the mappings
f : [0, T ] × Rn × U1 × U2 → Rn, σ : [0, T ] × Rn × U1 × U2 → Rn×d,
g : [0, T ] × Rn × Rm × Rm×d × U1 × U2 → Rm,
φ : Rn → Rm, ϕ,ϕi : Rn → R1, γ ,γi : Rm → R1,
l, li : [0, T ] × Rn × Rm × Rm×d × U1 × U2 → R1 (i = 1,2).
Assumption (H1): f , σ , and φ are {Ft}t0-adapted and continuously differentiable with respect to (x, v1, v2). They are
bounded by (1 + |x| + |v1| + |v2|) and their derivatives with respect to (x, v1, v2) are continuous and uniformly
bounded. g is uniformly Lipschitz in (y, z) and satisﬁes E
∫ T
0 |g(t, x,0,0, v1(t), v2(t))|2 dt < ∞, ∀x ∈ Rn , vi ∈ Ui .
Assumption (H2): l, li,ϕ,ϕi, γ and γi (i = 1,2) are continuously differentiable with respect to (x, y, z, v1, v2). There exists
a constant K0 such that their partial derivatives with respect to (x, y, z, v1, v2) are bounded by K0(1+ |x| + |y| + |z| +
|v1| + |v2|).
In the following, we specify the problem of nonzero-sum and zero-sum differential games of forward–backward stochas-
tic systems, respectively. For simplicity, we denote them by Problem I and Problem , respectively.
Consider an FBSDE⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dxv1,v2(t) = f (t, xv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t))dt + σ (t, xv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t))dB(t),
−dyv1,v2(t) = g(t, xv1,v2(t), yv1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t))dt − zv1,v2(t)dB(t),
xv1,v2(0) = x0, yv1,v2(T ) = φ
(
xv1,v2(T )
)
, 0 t  T .
(10)
Consider a performance criterion
J i
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)= E
[ T∫
0
li
(
t, xv1,v2(t), yv1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t)
)
dt + ϕi
(
xv1,v2(T )
)]
+ γi
(
yv1,v2(0)
)
(11)
with li(·, xv1,v2 (·), yv1,v2 (·), zv1,v2 (·), v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ H1(0, T ;R1) and ϕi ∈ L1FT (0, T ;R) for any (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 (i =
1,2), and
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)= E
[ T∫
0
l
(
t, xv1,v2(t), yv1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t)
)
dt + ϕ(xv1,v2(T ))
]
+ γ (yv1,v2(0)) (12)
with l(·, xv1,v2 (·), yv1,v2 (·), zv1,v2 (·), v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ H1(0, T ;R1) and ϕ ∈ L1 (0, T ;R) for any (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2.FT
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and Player i2 controls v2. The nonzero-sum differential games are formulated as follows:
Problem I. Find (u1(·),u2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 such that{
J1
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 J1
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)
,
J2
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 J2
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
,
(13)
for all (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2.
We call (u1(·),u2(·)) an open-loop equilibrium point of Problem I (if it exists). It is easy to see that the existence of an
open-loop equilibrium point implies⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
J1
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)= sup
v1(·)∈U1
J1
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)
,
J2
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)= sup
v2(·)∈U2
J2
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
.
The zero-sum differential games are formulated as follows:
Problem. Find (u1(·),u2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 such that
J
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
 J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 J
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)
, (14)
for all (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2.
We call (u1(·),u2(·)) an open-loop saddle point of Problem  (if it exists). In fact the existence of an open-loop saddle
point implies
J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)= sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
= inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
.
We shall specify this point in Theorem 3.4(iii).
3. A maximum principle for differential games of FBSDEs
3.1. A maximum principle for nonzero-sum games
In this section, we establish a maximum principle for Problem I. Firstly, we apply the classical convex variational tech-
niques to derive some variational inequalities. Then, we establish a necessary condition and a suﬃcient condition of an
equilibrium point of Problem I respectively.
Suppose (u1(·),u2(·)) is an equilibrium point of Problem I with the trajectory (x(·), y(·), z(·)) of (10). For all t ∈ [0, T ], let
vi(t) ∈ Ui be such that ui(·) + vi(·) ∈ Ui (i = 1,2). Notice that Ui is convex, then for 0 ρ  1, i = 1,2,
uiρ(t) = ui(t) + ρvi(t) ∈ Ui, 0 t  T .
Assume that the process (xρ(·), yρ(·), zρ(·)) is the trajectory under (u1ρ(·),u2ρ(·)). For notational simplicity, we deﬁne the
following symbol:
f (t) ≡ f (t, x(t),u1(t),u2(t)), σ (t) ≡ σ (t, x(t),u1(t),u2(t)),
g(t) ≡ g(t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t),u2(t)), l(t) ≡ l(t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t),u2(t)).
We introduce the following variational equations:⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
dxi(t) = [ fx(t)xi(t) + f vi (t)vi(t)]dt + [σx(t)xi(t) + σvi (t)vi(t)]dB(t),
−dyi(t) = [gx(t)xi(t) + gy(t)yi(t) + gz(t)zi(t) + gvi (t)vi(t)]dt − zi(t)dB(t),
xi(0) = 0, yi(T ) = φx
(
x(T )
)
xi(T ), i = 1,2.
(15)
For i = 1,2, t ∈ [0, T ], ρ > 0, we set
x˜i,ρ(t) ρ−1
(
xρ(t) − x(t)
)− xi(t), y˜i,ρ(t) ρ−1(yρ(t) − y(t))− yi(t),
z˜i,ρ(t) ρ−1
(
zρ(t) − z(t)
)− zi(t).
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Lemma 3.1. Let assumption (H1) hold. Then it yields, for i = 1,2,
lim
ρ→0 sup0tT
E
∣∣x˜i,ρ(t)∣∣2 = 0, lim
ρ→0 sup0tT
E
∣∣ y˜i,ρ(t)∣∣2 = 0,
lim
ρ→0E
T∫
0
∣∣z˜i,ρ(t)∣∣2 dt = 0. (16)
Proof. Firstly, we have{
dx˜i,ρ(t) = [ai,ρ1 (t)x˜i,ρ(t) + ai,ρ2 (t)]dt + [ai,ρ3 (t)x˜i,ρ(t) + ai,ρ4 (t)]dB(t),
x˜i,ρ(0) = 0,
where we denote ai,ρ· (t) as follows and omit the time subscript t in the right-hand of equality for simplicity
a1,ρ1 (t)
1∫
0
fx
(
x+ λρ(x1 + x˜1,ρ),u1 + λρv1,u2)dλ,
a2,ρ1 (t)
1∫
0
fx
(
x+ λρ(x2 + x˜2,ρ),u1,u2 + λρv2)dλ,
a1,ρ2 (t)
[
a1,ρ1 − fx(x,u1,u2)
]
x1 +
1∫
0
f v1
(
x+ λρ(x1 + x˜1,ρ),u1 + λρv1,u2)v1 dλ,
a2,ρ2 (t)
[
a2,ρ1 − fx(x,u1,u2)
]
x2 +
1∫
0
f v2
(
x+ λρ(x2 + x˜2,ρ),u1,u2 + λρv2)v2 dλ,
a1,ρ3 (t)
1∫
0
σx
(
x+ λρ(x1 + x˜1,ρ),u1 + λρv1,u2)dλ,
a2,ρ3 (t)
1∫
0
σx
(
x+ λρ(x2 + x˜2,ρ),u1,u2 + λρv2)dλ,
a1,ρ4 (t)
[
a1,ρ3 − σx(x,u1,u2)
]
x1 +
1∫
0
σv1
(
x+ λρ(x1 + x˜1,ρ),u1 + λρv1,u2)v1 dλ,
a2,ρ4 (t)
[
a2,ρ3 − σx(x,u1,u2)
]
x2 +
1∫
0
σv2
(
x+ λρ(x2 + x˜2,ρ),u1,u2 + λρv2)v2 dλ.
Applying Itô’s formula to |x˜i,ρ(t)|2 and noting the assumption (H1), we have
E
∣∣x˜i,ρ(t)∣∣2 = E
T∫
0
[〈
2x˜i,ρ(t),ai,ρ1 (t)x˜
i,ρ(t) + ai,ρ2 (t)
〉+ ∣∣ai,ρ3 (t)x˜i,ρ(t) + ai,ρ4 (t)∣∣2]dt
 CE
T∫
0
∣∣x˜i,ρ(t)∣∣2 dt + o(ρ).
Then we can get the ﬁrst convergence result of (16) from Gronwall’s inequality.
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E
∣∣ y˜i,ρ(t)∣∣2 +E
T∫
t
∣∣z˜i,ρ(s)∣∣2 ds CE
T∫
t
∣∣ y˜i,ρ(s)∣∣2 ds + 1
2
E
T∫
t
∣∣z˜i,ρ(s)∣∣2 ds + o(ρ).
By Gronwall’s inequality again, we get the last two convergent results of (16). 
Since (u1(·),u2(·)) is an equilibrium point, it follows that
ρ−1
[
J1
(
u1ρ(·),u2(·)
)− J1(u1(·),u2(·))] 0 (17)
and
ρ−1
[
J2
(
u1(·),u2ρ(·)
)− J2(u1(·),u2(·))] 0 (18)
are true. From (17), (18) and Lemma 3.1, we have
Lemma 3.2. Let assumptions (H1) and (H2) hold. Then the following variational inequality holds for i = 1,2:
E
T∫
0
[
lix(t)x
i(t) + liy(t)yi(t) + liz(t)zi(t) + livi (t)vi(t)
]
dt
+E[ϕix(x(T ))xi(T )]+E[γiy(y(0))yi(0)] 0. (19)
Proof. We ﬁrstly prove that (19) holds for i = 1. From (H1), (H2) and Theorem 3.1, we derive the following
ρ−1E
[
ϕ1
(
xu1ρ ,u2(T )
)− ϕ1(x(T ))]
= ρ−1E
[ 1∫
0
ϕ1x
(
x(T ) + λ(xu1ρ ,u2(T ) − x(T )))(xu1ρ ,u2(T ) − x(T ))dλ
]
→ E[ϕ1x(x(T ))x1(T )]. (20)
Similarly, we have
ρ−1E
[
γ1
(
yu1ρ ,u2(0)
)− γ1(y(0))]
= ρ−1E
1∫
0
γ1y
(
y(0) + λ(yu1ρ ,u2(0) − y(0)))(yu1ρ ,u2(0) − y(0))dλ
→ E[γ1y(y(0))y1(0)], (21)
and
ρ−1E
T∫
0
[
l1
(
t, xu1ρ ,u2(t), yu1ρ ,u2(t), zu1ρ ,u2(t),u1ρ(t),u2(t)
)− l1(t)]dt
→ E
T∫
0
[
l1x(t)x
1(t) + l1y(t)y1(t) + l1z(t)z1(t) + l1v1(t)v1(t)
]
dt. (22)
From (17) and (20)–(22), (19) follows for i = 1. By the similar method above, (19) also holds for i = 2. 
Next, before introducing the adjoint equations, we deﬁne the Hamiltonian function Hi : [0, T ] × Rn × Rm × Rm×d × U1 ×
U2 × Rm × Rn × Rn×d → R as follows:
Hi(t, x, y, z, v1, v2, pi,qi,ki)

〈
qi, f (x, v1, v2)
〉+ 〈ki,σ (x, v1, v2)〉− 〈pi, g(x, y, z, v1, v2)〉+ li(x, y, z, v1, v2).
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respectively. We denote
Hv1,v2i (t) ≡ Hi
(
t, xv1,v2(t), yv1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t), p
v1,v2
i (t),q
v1,v2
i (t),k
v1,v2
i (t)
)
and
Hi(t) ≡ Hi
(
t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t),u2(t), pi(t),qi(t),ki(t)
)
.
The adjoint equations satisfy the following generalized stochastic Hamiltonian system’s type:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
dpv1,v2i (t) = −Hv1,v2,∗iy (t)dt − Hv1,v2,∗iz (t)dB(t),
−dqv1,v2i (t) = Hv1,v2,∗ix (t)dt − kv1,v2i (t)dB(t),
pv1,v2i (0) = −γ ∗iy
(
yv1,v2(0)
)
,
qv1,v2i (T ) = −φ∗ix
(
xv1,v2(T )
)
pv1,v2i (T ) + ϕ∗ix
(
xv1,v2(T )
)
.
(23)
If the admissible controls are (v1(·), v2(·)) and (u1(·),u2(·)), we let (pv1,v2i (·),qv1,v2i (·),kv1,v2i (·)) and (pi(·),qi(·),ki(·)) be
the corresponding solutions of Eq. (23).
The main result of this paper is as follows:
Theorem 3.1 (Necessary maximum principle). Let (H1) and (H2) hold. Let (u1(·),u2(·)) be an equilibrium point of Problem I with the
corresponding solutions (x(·), y(·), z(·)) and (pi(·),qi(·),ki(·)) of (10) and (23). Then it follows that〈
H∗1v1(t), v1 − u1(t)
〉
 0 (24)
and 〈
H∗2v2(t), v2 − u2(t)
〉
 0 (25)
are true for any (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 , a.e., a.s.
Proof. We ﬁrstly prove that (24) is true. Applying Itô’s formula to 〈x1(t),q1(t)〉 + 〈y1(t), p1(t)〉, we obtain the following
result: ∀v1(·) ∈ U1 such that u1(·) + v1(·) ∈ U1,
E
[
ϕ1x
(
x(T )
)
x1(T )
]+E[γ1y(y(0))y1(0)]
= E
T∫
0
[−l1x(t)x1(t) − l1y(t)y1(t) − l1z(t)z1(t) − l1v1(t)v1(t)]dt
+E
T∫
0
〈
H∗1v1
(
t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t),u2(t), p1(t),q1(t),k1(t)
)〉
dt.
This together with the variational inequality (19) derives that
E
T∫
0
〈
H∗1v1(t), v1(t)
〉
dt  0,
for all t ∈ [0, T ], v1(t) ∈ U1 s.t. u1(·) + v1(·) ∈ U1, which implies (24). By the similar method above, (25) also holds. 
Remark 3.1. It is very meaningful and important to seek an explicit equilibrium point for game players. In general, it is
not easy to ﬁnd this. This is because the solution variables of the forward–backward stochastic systems (10) and (23) are
mutually coupled. In effect the state trajectory (xv1,v2 , yv1,v2 , zv1,v2 ) in (10) depends on the control (v1, v2), and the adjoint
process (pv1,v2i ,q
v1,v2
i ,k
v1,v2
i ) in (23) depends on both the control (v1, v2) and the state (x
v1,v2 , yv1,v2 , zv1,v2 ). By the neces-
sary maximum principle, Theorem 3.1, the control of the equilibrium point depends on both the state (xv1,v2 , yv1,v2 , zv1,v2 )
and the adjoint process (pv1,v2i ,q
v1,v2
i ,k
v1,v2
i ). So the foregoing procedures become a loop. In general, it is very hard to ﬁnd
an explicit equilibrium point. We may be able to ﬁnd an explicit equilibrium point when the state equations and the cost
functional are relatively simple.
In what follows, we proceed to establish the suﬃcient maximum principle (also called veriﬁcation theorem). For this, we
need an additional condition as follows:
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Theorem3.2 (Suﬃcient conditions for optimality). Let (H1), (H2) and (H3) hold. Let (u1(·),u2(·)) ∈ U1×U2 bewith the corresponding
solutions (x, y, z) and (pi,qi,ki) of Eqs. (10) and (23). Suppose
Hˆ1(t,a,b, c) = sup
v1∈U1
H1
(
t,a,b, c, v1,u2(t), p1(t),q1(t),k1(t)
)
,
Hˆ2(t,a,b, c) = sup
v2∈U2
H2
(
t,a,b, c,u1(t), v2, p1(t),q1(t),k1(t)
)
(26)
exist for all (t,a,b, c) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn × Rm × Rm×d, and are concave in (a,b, c) for all t ∈ [0, T ] (the Arrow condition). Moreover
H1
(
t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t),u2(t), p1(t),q1(t),k1(t)
)
= sup
v1∈U1
H1
(
t, x(t), y(t), z(t), v1,u2(t), p1(t),q1(t),k1(t)
)
, (27)
H2
(
t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t),u2(t), p2(t),q2(t),k2(t)
)
= sup
v2∈U2
H2
(
t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t), v2, p2(t),q2(t),k2(t)
)
. (28)
Then (u1(·),u2(·)) is an equilibrium point of Problem I.
Proof. Let (v1(·),u2(·)) and (u1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 be with the corresponding solutions (xv1 , yv1 , zv1 ) and (xv2 , yv2 , zv2 )
to Eq. (10). We deﬁne the following terms
H1(t) = H1
(
t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t),u2(t), p1(t),q1(t),k1(t)
)
,
Hv11 (t) = H1
(
t, xv1 , yv1 , zv1 , v1(t),u2(t), p1(t),q1(t),k1(t)
)
,
Hv21 (t) = H1
(
t, xv2 , yv2 , zv2 ,u1(t), v2(t), p1(t),q1(t),k1(t)
)
,
f (t) = f (t, x(t),u1(t),u2(t)), f v1(t) = f (t, xv1 , v1(t),u2(t)),
f v2(t) = f (t, xv2 ,u1(t), v2(t)),
and similarly deﬁne other terms σ v1 , σ v2 , . . . .
By virtue of the concavity property of ϕ1 and γ1, we have for ∀v1(·) ∈ U1
J1
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)− J1(u1(·),u2(·)) I1 + I2 + I3 (29)
with
I1 = E
[
γ1y
(
y(0)
)(
yv1(0) − y(0))],
I2 = E
[
ϕ1x
(
x(T )
)(
xv1(T ) − x(T ))],
I3 = E
T∫
0
(
lv1(t) − l(t))dt.
Applying Itô’s formula to 〈p1(t), yv1 (t) − y(t)〉 and 〈q1(t), xv1 (t) − x(t)〉,
I1 = −E
[〈
p1(T ),M
(
xv1(T ) − x(T ))〉]
−E
T∫
0
(〈
p1(t), g
v1(t) − g(t)〉+ 〈H∗1y(t), yv1(t) − y(t)〉
+ 〈H∗1z(t), zv1(t) − z(t)〉)dt, (30)
I2 = E
T∫
0
(〈
q1(t), f
v1(t) − f (t)〉+ 〈k1(t),σ v1(t) − σ(t)〉
− 〈H∗ (t), xv1(t) − x(t)〉)dt +E[〈p1(T ),M(xv1(T ) − x(T ))〉], (31)1x
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T∫
0
(
Hv11 (t) − H1(t) −
〈
q1(t), f
v1(t) − f (t)〉
− 〈k1(t),σ v1(t) − σ(t)〉+ 〈p1(t), gv1(t) − g(t)〉)dt. (32)
Substituting (30)–(32) into (29), it follows immediately that
J1
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)− J1(u1(·),u2(·)) E
T∫
0
(
Hv11 (t) − H1(t) −
〈
H∗1x(t), xv1(t) − x(t)
〉
− 〈H∗1y(t), yv1(t) − y(t)〉− 〈H∗1z(t), zv1(t) − z(t)〉)dt. (33)
By virtue of (27) and the concavity of Hˆ1, we conclude that
J1
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)− J1(u1(·),u2(·)) 0, (34)
for all v1(·) ∈ U1. By the similar method as shown in deriving (34), we can prove that
J2
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)− J2(u1(·),u2(·)) 0. (35)
Based on the arguments above, (u1(·),u2(·)) is an equilibrium point of Problem I. 
Remark 3.2. For (26) to hold, it suﬃces that both functions
(a,b, c, v1) → H1
(
t,a,b, c, v1,u2(t), p1(t),q1(t),k1(t)
)
and
(a,b, c, v2) → H2
(
t,a,b, c,u1, v2(t), p2(t),q2(t),k2(t)
)
are concave for all t ∈ [0, T ].
3.2. A maximum principle for zero-sum games
In this section, we consider zero-sum differential games of FBSDEs. In fact, zero-sum games are a special case of nonzero-
sum games. Based on the maximum principle of nonzero-sum games in Section 3.1, it is easy to obtain the maximum
principle of zero-sum games.
Let
−l1 = l2 = l, −ϕ1 = ϕ2 = ϕ, −γ1 = γ2 = γ . (36)
Then
H1(t, x, y, z, v1, v2, p1,q1,k1)

〈
q1, f (x, v1, v2)
〉+ 〈k1,σ (x, v1, v2)〉− 〈p1, g(x, y, z, v1, v2)〉− l(x, y, z, v1, v2), (37)
H2(t, x, y, z, v1, v2, p2,q2,k2)

〈
q2, f (x, v1, v2)
〉+ 〈k2,σ (x, v1, v2)〉− 〈p2, g(x, y, z, v1, v2)〉+ l(x, y, z, v1, v2), (38)
and
− J1 = J2 = J .
We denote
H1(t) ≡ H1
(
t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t),u2(t), p1(t),q1(t),k1(t)
)
and
H2(t) ≡ H2
(
t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t),u2(t), p2(t),q2(t),k2(t)
)
.
If (u1(·),u2(·)) is a saddle point of Problem , we have
J
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
 J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 J
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)
,
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J1
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 J1
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)
,
J2
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 J2
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
.
Therefore, (u1(·),u2(·)) is also an equilibrium point of Problem I with the special functions as in (36).
Applying the necessary condition of an equilibrium point in Theorem 3.1, we can directly derive the following necessary
maximum principle of the foregoing zero-sum games.
Theorem 3.3 (Necessary maximum principle). Let the assumptions (H1) and (H2) hold. Let (u1(·),u2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 be a saddle point
of Problem  with corresponding solutions (x, y, z) and (p,q,k) of Eqs. (10) and (23) where the Hamiltonian functions H1 and H2
are deﬁned by (37) and (38) respectively. Then it follows that〈
H∗1v1(t), v1 − u1(t)
〉
 0, (39)
and 〈
H∗2v2(t), v2 − u2(t)
〉
 0 (40)
are true for any (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2 , a.e., a.s.
Remark 3.3. Stochastic control problems can be regarded as zero-sum games with only one player. From this point, our
results in this section can be considered partial extensions to the relevant results in Peng [14], Shi and Wu [19], Xu [24],
Øksendal and Sulem [18], Shi and Wu [20]. For example, if the control v1(·) ≡ 0, the zero-sum game mentioned above is
reduced to a stochastic optimal control problem of FBSDEs. The assumptions (H1) and (H2) together with the inequality (40)
formulate a necessary maximum principle for optimal control of FBSDEs in a local form, which is the result of Peng [14].
Before we derive the suﬃcient condition of a saddle point, we ﬁrst introduce some notations. The Hamiltonian function
H : [0, T ] × Rn × Rm × Rm×d × U1 × U2 × Rm × Rn × Rn×d → R is deﬁned as follows:
H(t, x, y, z, v1, v2, p,q,k)

〈
q, f (x, v1, v2)
〉+ 〈k,σ (x, v1, v2)〉− 〈p, g(x, y, z, v1, v2)〉+ l(x, y, z, v1, v2).
We denote
Hv1,v2(t) ≡ H(t, xv1,v2(t), yv1,v2(t), zv1,v2(t), v1(t), v2(t), pv1,v2(t),qv1,v2(t),kv1,v2(t))
and
H(t) ≡ H(t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t),u2(t), p(t),q(t),k(t)).
The adjoint equations satisfy the following stochastic Hamiltonian system’s type:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
dpv1,v2(t) = −Hv1,v2,∗y (t)dt − Hv1,v2,∗z (t)dB(t),
−dqv1,v2(t) = Hv1,v2,∗x (t)dt − kv1,v2(t)dB(t),
pv1,v2(0) = −γ ∗y
(
yv1,v2(0)
)
,
qv1,v2(T ) = −φ∗x
(
xv1,v2(T )
)
pv1,v2(T ) + ϕ∗x
(
xv1,v2(T )
)
.
(41)
Then we have the following suﬃcient maximum principle of zero-sum games.
Theorem 3.4 (Suﬃcient conditions for optimality). Let (H1), (H2) and (H3) hold. Let (u1(·),u2(·)) ∈ U1 ×U2 be with the correspond-
ing solutions (x, y, z) and (p,q,k) of Eqs. (10) and (41). Suppose that the Hamiltonian function H satisﬁes the following conditional
mini-maximum principle:
inf
v1(·)∈U1
H
(
t, x(t), y(t), z(t), v1(t),u2(t), p(t),q(t),k(t)
)
= H(t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t),u2(t), p(t),q(t),k(t))
= sup
v2(·)∈U2
H
(
t, x(t), y(t), z(t),u1(t), v2(t), p(t),q(t),k(t)
)
. (42)
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Hˆ2(t,a,b, c) = sup
v2(·)∈U2
H
(
t,a,b, c,u1(t), v2, p(t),q(t),k(t)
)
exists for all (t,a,b, c) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn × Rm × Rm×d, and is concave in (a,b, c). Then we have
J
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
 J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
, for all v2(·) ∈ U2,
and
J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)= sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
.
(ii) Assume that both ϕ and γ are convex, and
Hˆ1(t,a,b, c) = inf
v1(·)∈U1
H
(
t,a,b, c, v1,u2(t), p(t),q(t),k(t)
)
exists for all (t,a,b, c) ∈ [0, T ] × Rn × Rm × Rm×d, and is convex in (a,b, c). Then we have
J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 J
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)
, for all v1(·) ∈ U1,
and
J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)= inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)
.
(iii) If both (i) and (ii) are true, then (u1(·),u2(·)) is a saddle point which implies
sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))= J(u1(·),u2(·))
= inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
.
Proof. (i) Using the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we can obtain the following:
J
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
 J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
, for all v2(·) ∈ U2. (43)
Furthermore
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
 J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
.
Since u2(·) ∈ U2, we have
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)= J(u1(·),u2(·)).
(ii) This statement can be proved in a similar way as shown before.
(iii) If both (i) and (ii) are true, then
J
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
 J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 J
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)
,
for all (v1(·), v2(·)) ∈ U1 × U2, i.e., (u1(·),u2(·)) is a saddle point.
In the following, on the one hand, we have
J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)
 inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·)v2(·)
))
,
and
J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
 sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
,
which imply that
sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
 J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
. (44)v2(·)∈U2
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J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)
 sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
and
J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
 inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
,
which imply that
sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
 J
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)
 inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
. (45)
Combining (44) and (45), we have
sup
v2(·)∈U2
(
inf
v1(·)∈U1
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))= J(u1(·),u2(·))= inf
v1(·)∈U1
(
sup
v2(·)∈U2
J
(
v1(·), v2(·)
))
. 
4. An example of a nonzero-sum game of FBSDE
In this section, we work out an example of nonzero-sum differential games of FBSDEs to illustrate our theoretical result.
Firstly, by applying the necessary optimality condition (see Theorem 3.1), we ﬁnd an explicit candidate equilibrium point.
Then by the suﬃcient condition of an equilibrium point (see Theorem 3.2), we verify that it is indeed an equilibrium point.
Finally, we obtain the explicit state trajectories and the explicit value of the performance criteria under the control of the
equilibrium point.
Example 4.1. Consider the system of FBSDE⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
dxv1,v2(t) = [a1(t)xv1,v2(t) + a2(t)v1(t) + a¯2(t)v2(t)]dt + [a3(t)xv1,v2(t)]dB(t),
−dyv1,v2(t) = [b1(t)xv1,v2(t) + b2(t)v1(t) + b¯2(t)v2(t)
+ b3(t)yv1,v2(t) + b4(t)zv1,v2(t)
]
dt − zv1,v2(t)dB(t),
xv1,v2(0) = x0, yv1,v2(T ) = xv1,v2(T ),
(46)
with the performance criteria
J1
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)= E
[ T∫
0
(
−1
2
v21(t) + d1(t)xv1,v2(t)
)
dt + e1 yv1,v2(0)
]
(47)
and
J2
(
v1(·), v2(·)
)= E
[ T∫
0
(
−1
2
v22(t) + d2(t)yv1,v2(t)
)
dt + e2xv1,v2(T )
]
. (48)
Here, ai , a¯i , bi , b¯i , di and ei are bounded and deterministic. The set of admissible controls is deﬁned by
Ui =
{
vi(·)
∣∣∣ vi(·) is an R1-valuedFt-adapted process and satisﬁes E
T∫
0
v2i (t)dt < ∞
}
, i = 1,2. (49)
Then (u1(·),u2(·)) in (56) is an equilibrium point, such that⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
J1
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)= sup
v1(·)∈U1
J1
(
v1(·),u2(·)
)
,
J2
(
u1(·),u2(·)
)= sup
v2(·)∈U2
J2
(
u1(·), v2(·)
)
.
(50)
Proof. (i) (u1(·),u2(·)) in (56) is a candidate equilibrium point.
In order to apply the necessary maximum principle, we ﬁrst write down the Hamiltonian function
H1(t, x, y, z, v1, v2, p1,q1,k1) q1
(
a1(t)x+ a2(t)v1 + a¯2(t)v2
)+ k1a3(t)x− 1
2
v21 + d1(t)x
− p1
(
b1(t)x+ b2(t)v1 + b¯2(t)v2 + b3(t)y + b4(t)z
)
(51)
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⎩
dp1(t) = b3(t)p1(t)dt + b4(t)p1(t)dB(t),
−dq1(t) =
[
a1(t)q1(t) + a3(t)k1(t) − b1(t)p1(t) + d1(t)
]
dt − k1(t)dB(t),
p1(0) = e1, q1(T ) = −p1(T ).
(52)
Similarly, we have
H2(t, x, y, z, v1, v2, p2,q2,k2) q2
(
a1(t)x+ a2(t)v1 + a¯2(t)v2
)+ k2a3(t)x− 1
2
v22 + d2(t)y
− p2
(
b1(t)x+ b2(t)v1 + b¯2(t)v2 + b3(t)y + b4(t)z
)
(53)
where (p2(·),q2(·),k2(·)) satisﬁes the following adjoint equation⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
dp2(t) =
(
b3(t)p2(t) − d2(t)
)
dt + b4(t)p2(t)dB(t),
−dq2(t) =
[
a1(t)q2(t) + a3(t)k2(t) − b1(t)p2(t)
]
dt − k2(t)dB(t),
p2(0) = 0, q1(T ) = −p2(T ) + e2.
(54)
By solving the decoupled FBSDEs (52) and (54), we obtain the following explicit solutions⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p1(t) = e1 exp
{ t∫
0
(
b3(s) − 1
2
b4(s)
2
)
ds +
t∫
0
b4(s)dB(s)
}
,
q1(t) = E
[
−p1(T )Γ t1 (T ) +
T∫
t
Γ t1 (s)
(−b1(s)p1(s) + d1(s))ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
,
p2(t) = −
t∫
0
d2(s)exp
{ t∫
s
(
b3(r) − 1
2
b4(r)
2
)
dr +
t∫
s
b4(r)dB(r)
}
ds,
q2(t) = E
[(−p2(T ) + e2)Γ t1 (T ) −
T∫
t
Γ t1 (s)b1(s)p2(s)ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
,
(55)
where
Γ t1 (s) = 1+
s∫
t
Γ t1 (r)a1(r)dr +
s∫
t
Γ t1 (r)a3(r)dB(r), s t.
By virtue of the necessary maximum principle (Theorem 3.1), we obtain a candidate equilibrium point (u1(·),u2(·)) with⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
u1(t) = a2(t)q1(t) − b2(t)p1(t)
= a2(t)E
[
−p1(T )Γ t1 (T ) +
T∫
t
Γ t1 (s)
(−b1(s)p1(s) + d1(s))ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
− b2(t)e1 exp
{ t∫
0
(
b3(s) − 1
2
b4(s)
2
)
ds +
t∫
0
b4(s)dB(s)
}
,
u2(t) = a¯2(t)q2(t) − b¯2(t)p2(t)
= a¯2(t)E
[(−p2(T ) + e2)Γ t1 (T ) −
T∫
t
Γ t1 (s)b1(s)p2(s)ds
∣∣∣∣Ft
]
+ b¯2(t)
t∫
0
d2(s)exp
{ t∫
s
(
b3(r) − 1
2
b4(r)
2
)
dr +
t∫
s
b4(r)dB(r)
}
ds,
(56)
where (p1(·), p2(·)) is denoted by (55).
(ii) (u1(·),u2(·)) in (56) is indeed an equilibrium point.
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and H2(t, x, y, z, v1, v2, p2,q2,k2) in (51) and (53) are concave in (x, y, z, v1, v2), respectively. Meanwhile H1 and H2 satisfy
the conditions (27) and (28), respectively. Applying the suﬃcient maximum principle (Theorem 3.2), (u1(·),u2(·)) proves an
equilibrium point indeed. 
In the following, we obtain the explicit state trajectories (x(·), y(·)) under the control (u1(·),u2(·)) in (56). For notational
simplicity, we deﬁne
Γ2(t) exp
{ t∫
0
(
a1(s) − 1
2
a3(s)
2
)
ds +
t∫
0
a3(s)dB(s)
}
,
Γ t3 (s) 1+
s∫
t
Γ t3 (r)b3(r)dr +
s∫
t
Γ t3 (r)b4(r)dB(r), s t.
By the classical multiplier factor method, we solve the system (46) and obtain the following explicit unique solution:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x(t) = Γ2(t)
{
x0 +
t∫
0
Γ −12 (s)
(
a2(s)u1(s) + a¯2(s)u2(s)
)
ds
}
,
y(t) = E
{
x(T )Γ t3 (T ) +
T∫
t
Γ t3 (r)
[
b2(r)u1(r) + b¯2(r)u2(r) + b1(r)x(r)
]
dr
∣∣∣∣Ft
}
= E
{
Γ2(T )
(
x0 +
T∫
0
Γ −12 (s)
(
a2(s)u1(s) + a¯2(s)u2(s)
)
ds
)
Γ t3 (T )
+
T∫
t
Γ t3 (r)
[
b2(r)u1(r) + b¯2(r)u2(r)
+ b1(r)Γ2(r)
(
x0 +
r∫
0
Γ −12 (s)
(
a2(s)u1(s) + a¯2(s)u2(s)
)
ds
)]
dr
∣∣∣∣Ft
}
,
(57)
where (u1(·),u2(·)) is deﬁned by (56). Substituting (57) into the performance criteria (47) and (48), we can obtain the
values of J1(u1(·),u2(·)) and J2(u1(·),u2(·)).
5. Conclusion
Motivated by LQ differential game with generalized expectation, this paper has investigated differential games of
forward–backward stochastic systems. By applying the classical convex variational techniques and the FBSDEs theory, we
established a necessary condition and a suﬃcient condition for equilibrium points of nonzero-sum games. Since zero-sum
games can be regarded as a special case of nonzero-sum games, we also derived the corresponding conditions for the saddle
point of zero-sum games. Compared with Buckdahn and Li [3], the performance criterion we considered is more general,
with a processing method different from their dynamic programming. Our result is an extension to Wang and Yu [22] and
Yu and Ji [30] for backward systems and Yu [29] for linear systems. Stochastic control problems can be considered as a
special case of zero-sum games with only one player. From this point of view, our results about zero-sum games represent
partial extensions to the relevant results in Peng [14], Shi and Wu [19], Xu [24], Øksendal and Sulem [18], Shi and Wu [20]
for stochastic control problems with forward–backward systems. To illustrate possible applications to theoretical results, this
paper has further worked out an example of a nonzero-sum differential game. We used the necessary condition to ﬁnd an
explicit candidate equilibrium point, and then employed the suﬃcient one to verify that it is indeed a unique equilibrium
point. Moreover, the explicit state trajectories and performance criteria have been obtained.
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